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In their IPC Policy Research Brief on “Privatising Basic
Utilities in Sub-Saharan Africa: the MDG Consequences”, Bayliss and
McKinley are right to argue that (i) few private investors have taken
much interest in water and electricity firms in Africa and of those that
have, many have done a poor job;  (ii) African governments were
pushed into accepting private participation in basic infrastructure
by international financial institutions and donors; (iii) African
governments still own and operate the bulk of the water and
electricity sectors and public ownership in these crucial areas will
continue for the foreseeable future; (iv) a larger percentage of the
desperately needed capital to rehabilitate and expand these networks
has to come from internal and ‘official’—i.e., donor—sources; and
(v) efforts to improve the operation of publicly-owned water
and electricity firms have to be redoubled.
Since I agree with so much of their diagnosis, why do I still feel
they have not offered the right prognosis and prescription?
The reasons are three:
First, I believe the authors overestimate the ease of improving
performance in state-owned firms.  In many African water and
electricity utilities, reduction of system losses, improved
maintenance, and network expansion were attempted for years prior
to the privatization push. But under pure public management, the
positive results, with or without donor assistance, were modest in
the extreme. The problem in Africa is that: historically, publicly
owned and managed utilities in these sectors, operating at less than
cost-recovery tariffs, have delivered an inadequate quantity and
poor quality of service; and they have delivered mainly to the better
off segments of the urban population. What new and different
methods of public management are being proposed to correct these
failed past efforts? Perhaps they can be found in the longer study
from which the Policy Research Brief is drawn; I find none here.
Second, they underestimate the amount of investment capital
required in run-down African water and electricity sectors.  The
financing needs are huge—much larger than any realistic increases
in both internal revenue generation and donor funds. True, a
number of past efforts to attract private investors have proven
costly and counterproductive, but the fact remains that private
capital must somehow be tapped if Africa is to repair and enlarge
its basic infrastructure to meet ever-growing demand.
Third, the Policy Research Brief does not mention the promising
‘hybrid’ experiments that combine local African private
management with public ownership. For example, the Athi Water
Services Commission (AWSC) is a hybrid mechanism to manage the
water supply of the greater Nairobi area. The physical and financial
performance of the traditional water department of the Nairobi
City Council (NCC) had been disastrous. In 2000, donors
recommended a lease contract to attract international private
providers. The Kenyans rejected this advice and constructed the
following: at the top, they created a new national water regulator
(which will eventually set tariffs and monitor service quality, but does
little right now). Next, the AWSC was created and its management
procured from the Kenyan private sector—no non-Kenyans were
allowed to bid. The team chosen basically consists of engineers who
used to work in the city water department. They had to resign from
government service to seek these new posts.
The AWSC is a corporation, a joint stock company. All of its shares are
owned by the Nairobi City Council. AWSC was given a lease to manage
the water production and distribution and the revenue collection in
the area. It has to pay a small fixed percentage of its collections each
month to the regulator and a much larger ‘lease fee’—also a fixed
percentage of revenues collected—to the NCC.  It hires and supervises
a water providing company, which is paid for its costs. As of 2006, all
workers in the water providing company were former employees of
the water department of the NCC. To reduce worker opposition to the
scheme, this provider was not competitively procured; the former NCC
employees were given the chance to prove themselves.
In its first 18 months of operation, AWSC succeeded in covering
Operations and Maintenance costs due to much more rigorous
collection efforts, even though the tariff had not changed, and even
after subtracting the 15 per cent of revenues paid to the NCC and
the regulator. Customer satisfaction is up considerably. Performance
has definitely improved. But AWSC is covering only variable costs
(though this in itself is an uncommon achievement). It has also
inherited substantial debt that is not being serviced. AWSC is
negotiating with the NCC and the central government to reduce
this burden, attributable to the poor management of the past.
Depreciation of capital is not being covered, nor is there yet any
surplus for crucially needed investments and expansion. The hope
is that in the short term donors will meet these needs—the French
have already contributed a modest amount and negotiations are
planned with the World Bank.
To be sure, this is a first and partial step, with a number of problems
still unresolved, chief among them the lack of a solution to the
critical investment problem. But it is a promising combination of
private management and public ownership that just may generate
more private money. Similar schemes of this sort are in progress in
several other African cities.
So, in a nutshell, the solution is not to eschew private investment,
but rather find mechanisms to make it more politically acceptable,
more socially responsible and more mutually beneficial.
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